University of Pennsylvania

Law Review
And Americali Law Register
FOUNDED 1852
Published Monthly, November to June, by the University of Pennsylvania
Law School. at 236 Chestnut Street., Philadelphia, Pa.. and
34th and Chestnut Streets, Philadelphia, Pa.
$2.50 PER ANNUM; FOREIGN, $3.o0; SINGLE COPIES, 35 CENTS.
Board of Editors
RAYMOND K. DENWORTH
Editor-in-Chief
EDWIN A. LUCAS
Case Editor
RODNEY T. BONSALL
EARLSON L. HARGETT
THOMAS L. HOBAN
P. HERBERT REIGNER
HAROLD D. SAYLOR
W. WALLACE SMITH
CARLTON B. WEBB
BARNIE WINKELMAN
J. GRIER BARTOL

Associate Editors
J.

HAMILTON CHESTON
CHARLES C. EVANS
THOMAS K. FINLETTER
V. LOGAN FOX
HENRY H. HOUCK
OTTO P. MANN
HAROLD F. MOOK
G. MASON OWLEIT
PAUL J. SYKES
ERNEST N. VOTAW
Business Manager
B. M. SNOVER

NOTES.
LAW SCHOOL-ORDER OF THE CoiF-At the annual meeting of
the University of Pennsylvania Chapter of the Order of the Coif, held

April 20, 1917, the following members of the Class of 1917 were
elected to membership: Raymond K. Denworth, Edwin A. Lucas,

W. Foster Reeve, III, Barnie Winkelman.
The following resolution was adopted:
"That the Chapter establish an annual prize of twenty-five
dollars for that member of the second-year class who obtains the
highest average for his or her second-year work, to be known as
the 'Order of the Coif Prize.'"
(784)

NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POLICE POWER-DUE PROCESS OF LAW
-EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS---"BLUE SKY" LAw-The Su-

preme Court with but one dissenting vote has in a series of cases
upheld the validity of various state statutes regulating dealings in
corporate securities.' The so-called "blue sky" laws get their name
from the phrase describing certain financial ventures as "speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue
sky." They are passed under the state police power and are, therefore, very apt to be declared constitutional, because that of all governmental powers is least likely to be restricted by the courts. The
decisions here noted are therefore chiefly important from the standpoint of the stock and bond business, representing an interesting
but not new development of the law, except perhaps in one respect.
The Ohio statute provides for the issuance of licenses at the discretion of a single official, not a commission as usual, and therefore
it
2
would seem to go further than previous state enactments.
In the cases here considered the statutes of Ohio, South Dakota,
and Michigan," are upheld, the objections to their constitutionality
being easily overruled by Justice McKenna in his several opinions.
These laws forbid generally the dealing in corporate or quasicorporate securities without first securing a license from the State
Securities Commission-in the case of Ohio the state superintendent
of banks and banking-obtainable only upon an application setting
forth certain information respecting the applicant's business, with
references establishing good repute. The prescribed data has to be
filed with the commission and licensed dealers are then prohibited
from transacting business in any other than approved securities or
on any other plan than that set forth in the statements and papers
filed.
The first alleged ground for the unconstitutionality of these laws
was that arbitrary power had been conferred on the licensing officials
and that the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment were
therewith infringed upon. It was held that a proper sense of duty
must be accorded the agents of the state together with the presumption that the functions intrusted to them would be executed in the
public interest, not wantonly or arbitrarily. 4 Denial of necessary
discretion to commissioners would be to take from the government

one of its most essential instrumentalities, of which the various state
and national commissions are instances.5 Many cases have sus1

Hall v. Geiger Jones Co.; Hall v. Coultrap; Hall v. Rose and the Ri Chard
Auto Mfg. Co.; Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co.; Merrick v. Halsey
and Co. et al., reported in 37 Supreme Court Reporter 217-232.
'Ohio General Code, Secs. 63%3-I to 6373-24.
' South Dakota Laws 1915, Chapter 275; Michigan Pub. Acts i9,5, Act
No. 46.
'Justice McKenna in 37 Sup. Ct. Reporter 222.
'State v. Gray, 6i Conn. 39 (i8gi) ; People v. Warden of City Prison, 30
N. Y. Supp. Io95 (,894).
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stained ordinances providing for licenses the requirements for which
included good character and reputation of the applicant. The failure to set up a standard for the enforcement of the law is not evidence of its being arbitrary; only when an individual enforces it in
such manner does it become unconstitutional.7 Clear proof that the
laws themselves are not arbitrary is shown by the provision that
whenever detriment may be caused to one denied a license he is
allowed judicial review of the commission's decision on the facts.
Such guarantees of justice do not deny due process.
The other principal argument against constitutionality was that
equal protection of the laws was denied by discriminating between
cases where more or less than 5o per cent. of an issue of bonds is
included in a sale to one person, between securities which have and
those which have not been authorized by certain state officials, between securities issued by corporations organized under the state
laws and those which are not, etc., etc. The final answer to such
allegations is that the state has the power of classification.8 Since
the police power is exercised presumably for the public welfare in
general there is no class legislation when laws are directed against
particular wrongs. There is always an ulterior public purpose, although it seems on its face to be legislation willfully attacking a limited group. 9 A state "may direct its law against what it deems the
evil as it actually exists, without covering the whole field of possible
abuses, and it may do so none the less that the forbidden act does
not differ in kind from those that are allowed.

.

.

.

If a class is

deemed to present a conspicuous example of what the legislature
seeks to prevent, the Fourteenth Amendment allows it to be dealt
with, although otherwise and merely logically not distinguishable
from others not embraced in the law."'" In a word, classification
need not be ideal, but in general accord with business practice.
It is more firmly than ever established that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not abridge the effective use of the police power.
There can be little doubt that the decisions in the "blue sky" cases
are in strict accord with the great tendency of the courts to uphold
statutes exercising that power. So long as laws are intended to
promote health, morals, peace, education and good order, to increase
the industry of the state, etc., they will not deny equal protection,
'Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183 (189g); Red "C" Oil Mfg. Co. v.
Board of Agriculture, 222 U. S. 38o (1911); Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial
Commission, 236 U. S. 230 (1914) ; Brazee v. Michigan, 241 U. S. 34o (1915);
Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505 (1902).
'Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886).
* International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U. S.199 (1914).
'Union Bridge Co. v. U. S. 204 U. S. 364 (19o7).
' Central Lumber Co. v. S. Dakota, 226 U. S. 157 (1912) ; see also Armour
& Co. v. N. Dakota, 24o U. S. 517 (1915).

NOTES

and if at the same time they provide proper notice and an opportunity for hearing they will not be found unconstitutional as denying
due process of law.
H.D.S.

GUARANTY - NECESSITY FOR NOTICE OP ACCEPTANCE - In its
essence the guaranty is but a simple contract and as such is governed by the rules usually applicable to those instruments. In one
respect, however, a notable divergence has arisen in a large number
of American cases, when dealing with certain forms of guaranties.
This difference occurs in connection with the formation of the contract, the mutual assent which is necessary, and consists in the necessity of notice being given to the guarantor that the guarantee accepts.
This rule seems to have originated in two Federal decisions I early
in the nineteenth century; and while probably dicta in those cases,
it has now become the law, not only of the 2Federal courts, but of
the great majority of the State courts as well.
This necessity for giving notice is based on the assumption that
the guarantor is the offeror, and that, unless notified, he is placed at
a great disadvantage in that he does not know whether he has incurred any liability in respect of that offer, and so cannot take steps
to protect himself. With this in mind, it is evident that, being based
at least partially on public convenience, it has no bearing on certain
kinds of guaranties 3 And that this is true is shown by the fact that
the interpretation of the instrument sued on is of prime importance.
For if it is an absolute guaranty, there is general agreement that
notice is unnecessary,4 and so in certain other situations, as where it
is given for a contract already made within the knowledge of the
guarantor.5
A recent case I in Massachusetts is illustrative of one instance
where notice is deemed unnecessary. An offer was made to a
1
Russell v. Clark's Exrs., 7 Cranch 69 (U. S. 1812) ; Cremer v. Higginson,
i Mason 323 (U. S. C. C. 1817).
2 Sears v. Swift & Co., 66 Ill. App. 496 (I896) ; De Crener v. Anderson,
113 Mich. 578 (1897); Acme Mfg. Co. v. Reed, Ix9 Pa. 359 (i9oo); Miami
Co. Bank v. Goldberg, 133 Wis. i75 (907).
'The rules are summed up in Davis Sewing Machine Co. v. Richards, Ji S
U. S. 524 (1885), as follows: "If the guaranty is signed by the guarantor at
the request of the other party, or if the latter's agreement to accept is contemporaneous with the guaranty, or if the receipt from him of a valuable consideration, however small, is acknowledged in the guaranty, the mutual assent is
proved, and the delivery of the guaranty to him or for his use completes the
contract." See also Davis v. Wells, Fargo & Co., io4 U. S. I59 (i88I).
'Boyd v. Snyder, 49 Md. 325 (1878) ; Wise v. Miller, 45 Ohio 388 ('887).
'Nading v. McGregor, 121 Ind. 465 (x889).

' Stauffer v. Koch et aL, II4 N. E.

75o (Mass. 1917).
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prospective vendor of goods, to guarantee on certain terms. This
was refused,-and a proposition was sent back to the defendants with
a blank guaranty, which they signed. The court held that this latter
was not an offer to guarantee requiring notice of acceptance, but
an acceptance in itself, of the vendor's proposal. Granting such an
interpretation of the guaranty, this case represents the weight of
authority on this point.7 There is, however, some authority for holding that notice of acceptance is required in this case as much as when
the guaiantor makes the offer.3 .In view of the fact that the true
basis of the general view as to notice, seems to be that of public
convenience, there is much in favor of this minority view. For there
is essentially as much necessity for a knowledge of one's possible
liability, as when the guarantor makes the first move.
In the ordinary case, however, granting that notice should be
given, it is important to determine whether the notice is a condition
precedent or merely subsequent. There are cases which at least
imply that the former is true: that until notice has been given no
contract of guaranty exists.9 It would seem, however; that the more
logical view is, that the advance made or act done at the request of
the guarantor, is the acceptance necessary to make a binding contract; but that the advantage of this may be lost if notice thereof is
not given within a reasonable time.10 And indeed, if this American
doctrine is to be adopted, this latter view is the better.
That it is generally referred to as the "American" doctrine, is
due not only to the fact that it does not exist in England, but that
1
there is hardly a hint of it. As early as Somersall v. Barneby,
neceswas
notice
the question was raised; but the court held that no
12
sary. And comparatively recently this necessity was hinted at in
the argument of counsel, three years having elapsed between the time
of extending credit and the suit; but the court did not refer to the
point in its decision, and held the guarantor liable. One of the leading American cases upholding the English view is Douglass v.
Howland.13 And Justice Cowan in that case undoubtedly criticizes
the rule already promulgated in other courts; and lays it down that
on principle no notice is necessary, the act done being the acceptance.
Later cases in New York, however, appear to weaken the effect of

'See also Frost v. Standard Metal Co., 116 Ill. App.642 (19o4), and the.
rules laid down in Davis S. M. Co. v. Richards, supra, note 3.
v. McCormick 167 Pa. 247 0895); Columbia Baking Co. v.
'
Schissler, 35 Pa. Super. 621 (igo8).
'Davis S. M. Co. v. Richards, supra, note 3; Craft v. Isham, 13 Conn.
28 (1838).
"Anson, Contracts (iith Ed.), p.32n.
" Cro. Jac. 287 (Eng. 1611).
'2Sorby v.Gordon, 30 L.T. 528 (Eng.1874).
1 24 Wend. 35 (N. Y. 184o).
-

NOTES

this decision. 1" For they emphasize the fact that notice is unnecessary in the case of an absolute guaranty; with the resulting implication that it may be different in the case of an offer to guarantee.
The effect of these cases is at least an intimation that eventually the
ruling of the Federal courts will be followed in all the states.
Purely as a matter of public convenience, this would probably be a
beneficial result; yet it is difficult to see how it can be justified simply
on principle.1 5
R.T.B.
INSURANcE-Is DEATH FROM PTOMAINE POISON AN ACCIDENT?
-The usual policy of accident insurance limits the liability of the
insurer, inter alia, to injuries or death effected through "external,
violent and accidental means"; and the interpretation of this phrase
has been productive of much litigation, remarkable because of the
absence of conflicting decisions by the courts. This phrase, having
been inserted in the policy by the insurers for the purpose of restricting their liability, is very strictly construed against them, in
accordance with the usual policy of the courts in similar cases.
The words "external and violent" have had little, if any, effect
upon the courts in the interpretation of the phrase, and most of the
controversies have arisen over the interpretation of the word "accidental," which was defined by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case of Mut. Acc. Assn. v. Barry,1 as follows: "The
term 'accidental' was used in the policy in its ordinary, popular
sense, as meaning happening by chance; unexpectedly taking place;
not according to the usual course of things; or not as expected. If a
result is such as follows from ordinary means, voluntarily employed,
in a not unusual or unexpected way, it cannot be called a result
effected by accidental means. But if, in the act which precedes the
injury, something unforeseen, unexpected, unusual occurs, which
produces the injury, then the injury has resulted through accidental
means." Apparently, the word is interpreted from an objective viewpoint; that is, if the injury is unexpected and unintended by the
person injured, it may be accidental as to him, though the normal
result of an intentional act of another person. Thus it has been
held that where one person unexpectedly, and without provocation,
purposely injures another, the injury is accidental as to the person
hurt.2 So also, if an insane or delirious person injures himself, the
" Natl. Bank v. Phelps, 86 N. Y. 484 (i88)

; Niles Tool-Works Co. v.

Reynolds,
38 N. Y. Supp. io28 (1896).
' 1For a more detailed discussion see "Notice of Acceptance in Contracts
of Guaranty," 5 Columbia Law Rev. 215 (,905).
2 131

U. S. 1o,

121

(i889).

See also Etna Life Ins. Co. v. Vandecar, 86

Fed. 282 (i8g8) ; Bailey v. Interstate Casualty Co., 158 N. Y. 723 (1899).
'Hutchcraft v. Travelers Ins. Co., 87 Ky. 3oo (i888); Fidelity, etc., Co.
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injury is accidental within the terms of the policy, because it was
not the result of his intentional act.3 An injury may also be accidental, although the direct result of an intentional act of the party
injured, provided the result was unusual and not to be expected
due to inadvertently
from the act done, as where the injury has been
4
taking poison in mistake for something else, because in such cases
the party did not intend to take poison. It is impossible to formulate any definite rule upon this phase of the problem, because the
courts have preferred to decide each case upon its individual merits,
rather than by any concrete prinbiple of law. Thus it has been held
that where a person took an overdose of poison by mistake, his consequent death was accidental ;5 but where he took only as much as
he intended, not knowing that such a dose would be fatal, his consequent death was not accidental. So also death caused by the eating
of unwholesome food, not known to be so, has been held to be accidental, as where the insured contracted ptomaine poison from eating
mushrooms or oysters.7 Although death due to blood poison, resulting from a wound, or to ptomaine poison resulting from eating
unwholesome food is universally held to be accidental within the
meaning of the policy, death due to typhoid fever resulting from
drinking polluted water, is probably not accidental, as it is caused
directly by a disease which is usually expressly excepted from accident policies; and sunstroke is also considered by the courts as a
disease and not an accident.8
The word "external," in the policy, has been construed by the
courts as referring to the force and not to the injury. In other
words, the injury is covered by the policy if produced by the introduction of an external force or agency into the system, although the
injury itself was effected entirely internally. Thus poison, taken
into the system and operating internally, is nevertheless an external
cause; as, for example, the inhalation of gas producing asphyxiation.' It may be stated as a general rule that if the cause of the
v. Johnson, 72 Wis. 333 (1894); Travelers Ins. Co. v. McConkey,
661 (i888).

127

U. S.

' Acc. Ins. Co. v. Crandal, 120 U. S. 527 (887) ; Cady v. Fidelity Co., 134
Wis. 322 (19o8).
'Healey v. Mut. Acc. Assn., 133 Ill. 556 (i8go); Pollock v. Mut. Acc.
Assn., Io2 Pa. St. 230 (883).
' Carnes v. Iowa Assn., io6 Iowa 28, (1898) ; Dezell v. Fidelity Co., 376
Mo. 253 (903).

'Bayless v. Travelers' Ins. Co., i4 Blatchf. 143 (U. S. C. C. 87) ; Carnes
v. Iowa Assn., supra, n. 5.
U. S. Casualty Co. v. Griffis, 114 N. E. 83 (Ind. 1916) ; Md. Casualty Co.
v. Hudgins, 72 S. W. io47 (Tex. i9O2); reversed on another point. 97 Tex.
124

(3903).

"Dozier v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 46 Fed. 446 (i8gi).
427 for a general review of the cases.
' Paul v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 112 N. Y. 472 (i889).

See also i C. J.

NOTES

injury or death can be shown to be due to accidental or unnatural
means, this imports that such injury or death is due to external and
violent means. 10 Thus, where the insured was found dead in bed
with the gas turned on, it was held that his death was due to external.
violent and accidental means. 1 So also, where the insured froze to
death because of a breakdown of his conveyance, and the consequent
enforced exposure ;12 and also where the insured died from blood
poison, resulting from the bite of an insect.'3
The word ."violent," as used in the policy, does not require that
there should be a breaking of tissues of the body; and very slight
violence, if any, is necessary to obtain a recovery, if the injury was
accidental within the usual definition of the term. Accordingly, it
has been held that recovery may be had, under the policy, for death
by accidental drowning ;14 or for an injury produced by a strain from
lifting. 5 It should be noted, however, that where there is a dormant disease, which is brought into activity by the exertions of the
insured, his resulting death is not caused by external, violent and
accidental means.' This is a very troublesome class of case for the
courts to decide. The general rule seems to be that if the disease
was due solely to an accidental cause, as ptomaine poison from unintentionally eating unwholesome food, then the resulting death is
covered by the policy. But if there was some latent constitutional
weakness in the insured, which was so stimulated by his exertions.
as to unexpectedly produce his death, there can be no recovery
under the policy, because, in such case, the exertion of the insured
was not the direct and potent cause of his death. In close cases, the
general principle is very difficult of application, and the courts frequently treat it as a matter of fact for the jury to determine. 17
E.L.H.

MORTGAGES-ASSUMPTION

BY MORTGAGOR'S GRANTEE-LIABIL-

ITY TO MORTGAGEE-It goes without saying that there are few ques-

tions in the common law concerning which there has been so great
a diversity of opinion as that of the right of a third party to sue on
a contract made for his benefit. One phase of this question is that
of the liability of a grantee of land subject to a mortgage, who un"Travelers' Assn. v. Smith, 85 Fed. 401 (I898); Bacon v. Mut. Aec.
Assn., 123 N. Y. 3o4 (i89o).
"Paul v. Travelers' Ins. Co., supra, n. 9, overruling in part Hill v. Hartford Ins. Co., 22 Hun 187 (N. Y. i88o).
" Travelers' Assn. v. London Guarantee Co., ioMan. 537 (Canada I895).
' Omberg v. Mut. Acc. Assn., IOI Ky. 303 (1897).
"Mfrs. Acc. Indem. Co. v. Dorgan, 58 Fed. 945 (1893) ; Wehle v. Mut.
Acc. Assn., 153 N. Y. 116 (1897) ; but see Tennant v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 33

Fed. 322 (897).

" Rustin v. Ins. Co., 58 Neb. 792 (1899).
" Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Selden, 78 Fed. 285 (897).
" Mfrs. Acc. Indem. Co. v. Dorgan, supra, n. 14; Railway Acc. Assn. v.
Coady, 8o Ill. App. 563 (1899).
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dertakes to pay the mortgage. As is said in a leading text, "it is a
curious circumstance that though a promise by a third person to
pay a mortgage debt cannot be distinguished in principle from a
promise to pay any other debt, the question has been to some extent separately dealt with. Perhaps, because the subject of mortgages fell within the scope of equity jurisdiction, the attempt was
early made by mortgagees to sue in equity those who had assumed
an obligation to pay the mortgage, while no such attempt was made
with other debts."'- However this-may be, the problem is recognized
as a distinct one, although not unconnected with the larger problem.
In the absence of statutes controlling the question, the decisions
show considerable variation, ranging all the way from a refusal to
allow the promise to inure in any way to the benefit of the mortgagee,
to allowing him a recovery at law for a deficiency arising on the
sale of the mortgaged premises. Massachusetts, holding to the strict
English view, denies the mortgagee any right to recover because he
is a stranger to the consideration. 2 The other extreme is the law
of the great majority of states, the mortgagee being allowed to sue
in assumpsit on the promise made to the mortgagor to pay the morlgage. 3 Between these two extremes are several intermediate positions. One of these is to consider the third party's right to sue on a
promise for his benefit as resting entirely on equitable principles,4
the only difference from the preceding view being procedural.
Another large class of cases take the position that the right
depends on the principle of subrogation, the creditor being entitled
to the benefit of the security obtained by the mortgagor from his
grantee. This view is the one followed by the federal courts,5 by
New Jersey' and by other important jurisdictions.7 Under it the
right of the mortgagee is derivative, and it therefore follows that
any valid defence against the mortgagor is sufficient to bar action
by the mortgagee. So, where a mortgagor who is not personally
"Pollock on Contracts, Third American Ed., p. 26o.
' Mellen v. Whipple, i Gray 317 (1854) ; Creesy v. Willis, 159 Mass. 249
(x893) ; Goodenough v. Labrie, 206 Mass. 599 (1910).
Hare v. Murphy, 45 Neb. 8og (i8_95) Marble Savings Bank v. Mesarvey,
ioi Ia. 285 (897) ; Wyatt v. Dufrene, io6 Ill. App. 214 (I9o2); Merriman v.
Schmitt, 211 Ill. 263 (19o4); Burr v. Beers, 24 N. Y. 178 (1861); Enos v.
Sanger, 96 Wis. I5o (1897). For other cases, see Jones on Mortgages, Seventh
Ed., Sec. 762, note.
'Ayres v. Randall, io8 Ind. 595 (i886); Spears v. Scott, iii Ga. 745
(igoo). See also Pollock on Contracts, Third Ed., pp. 244, 263.

*Kellar v. Ashford, 133 U. S. 61o (1889).
'Mount v. Van Ness, 33 N. J.Eq. 262 (i88o); Eakin v. Shultz, 6i N. J.
Eq. 156 (19oo); Acton v. Shultz, 69 N. J. Eq. 7 (905); Holland Reform
School Society v. De Lazier, 85 N. J.Eq. 497 (I916).
'Ward v. De Oca, 120 Cal. 102 (1898); Osborne v. Cabell, 77 Va. 462
(T883) ; Clement v. Willett, io5 Minn. 267 (igo8).
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liable conveys to one who assumes the payment8 of the mortgage,
the promise is not enforceable by the mortgagee.
The question, so far as Pennsylvania is concerned, is one controlled by statute. The Act of I878,' after providing that a grantee
of real estate subject to ground rent, mortgage, or other incumbrance
shall not be personally liable for the payment thereof, unless he
shall, by an agreement in writing, have expressly assumed a personal
liability therefor, or unless there are express words in the deed to
that effect, goes on to provide that "the right to enforce such personal
liability shall not inure to any person other than the person with
whom such agreement is made." It seems that the wording of this
statute leaves no room for doubt as to its meaning. The*decisions,
however, present a very curious development in the construction of
this act, and show that, until recent years, the effect of the act was
very much involved in uncertainty.
The law prior to the passage of the act is stated in Merriman
v. Moore,10 decided subsequently to the passage of the act, but not
affected by it for the reason that the act was held not to be retrospective in its operation. In that case the mortgagor's vendee was
held personally liable to the mortgagee on the promise made to the
mortgagor. The liability is placed squarely on the proposition that
the vendor may direct how the purchase money shall be paid, and
that it is of no consequence to the vendee whether or not his vendor
was liable for the payment. This proposition, which gives the mortgagee a right to sue independent of the mortgagor's rights, is clearly
an exception to the general rule in this state as to a third party's
right to sue on a contract.
After the passage of the act there seems to have been little dis-position to question its meaning until the cases of Blood v. Crew
Levick Co." In deciding these cases the court took the position that
the defendant's express covenant to pay might be enforced by an
action brought in the name of the covenantee to the use of the holder
of the mortgage. 12 If this decision had been accepted as settling the
law of this state, the act in question would be a dead letter so far as
its practical importance is concerned. The later decisions,3 however,
do not bear out this interpretation. In Fisler v. Reach,' the court
modified the effect of Blood v. Crew Levick Co., by restricting the
right to sue in the mortgagor's name to cases where the consent ol
the mortgagor has been obtained. Since that case there have been
'Norwood v. De Hart, 30 N. J. Eq. 413 (879)

N. J. Eq.

297

(i9o6); Ward v. De Oca, supra.

; Klemmer v. Kerns, 71

'P. L. 205.
Merriman v. Moore, go Pa. 78 (1879).
"Blood v. Crew Levick Co.,

American Law Register, p. 8o2.
"

171 Pa. 328, 342 (1895).

Pp. 334, 343.

" Fisler v. Reach,

202

Pa. 74

(i9o2).

See note in 44

794

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

several decisions 1" which hold the promise of the grantee to be
merely one to indemnify the mortgagor, and therefore one which
cannot inure to the benefit of the mortgagee.
The latest of these cases 15 arose out of the attempt of the state
officials to settle a tax against a corporation which was the grantee
in a deed from an individual, the corporation agreeing to assume
a mortgage on the premises. The court held that this stipulation,
under the Act of 1878, could not have the effect of making the corporation liable to the mortgagee for the debt, but was merely a contract of indemnity between the grantor and grantee, and that, therefore, the mortgage debt was not taxable as corporate indebtedness.
This decision, reaffirming the rule laid down in three decisions "a
within the last six years in cases where the question was squarely
presented before the court, must be considered as removing all doubt
heretofore existing, 7 and it may be confidently asserted that Merriman v. Moore, although frequently cited by courts and text
writers, 8 no longer represents the law of Pennsylvania. The result
is to. give full effect to the obvious meaning of the Act of 1878, and
to bring the Pennsylvania law on this subject, by operation of
statute, into the same position as that reached in Massachusetts in
the absence of statute. It is also worth noting that this result is in
accord with the general rule in Pennsylvania as to the right of a
third party to sue on a promise, 9 and that the anomalous exception
of a promise to pay a mortgage from the rule as to other debts has
ceased to exist.
W.W.S.
REcEIVERs-NECESSITY FOR LEAVE TO SUE A REcEIvER-It

may

be stated as a general rule that a receiver may not be sued without
permission of the court which appointed him, but whether failure
to first obtain leave to sue affects the jurisdiction of another court
to consider and determine a controversy to which a receiver is a
party is a disputed question and the cases are in apparently hopeless
"Sloan v. Klein, 230 Pa. 132 (i911) ; Tritten's Estate, 238 Pa. 555 (i913);
Smith v. Danielson, 45 Pa. Super. 125 (1911); Commonwealth v. DuPont
Land Co., 254 Pa. 446 (i916).
"Commonwealth v. DuPont Land Co., supra.
"Supra, note 13.
" Even so late as 1914, the following dictum occurred in a Superior Court
case: "The fact that in the line of the conveyances one of the grantees was
not personally liable for the mortgage debt, does not alter or affect the
relation of subsequent grantees who agreed to pay. They are all held liable
to-the mortgagee under their covenant. Merriman v. Moore, supra." Willock's
Estate, 58 Pa. Super. i59.
"Pollock on Contracts, Third American Ed., p. 26o, note 6; Jones on
Mortgages, Seventh Ed., Sec. 76o.
,

First M. E. Church v. Isenberg, 246 Pa. 221 (914).

NOTES

confusion. In a recent Indiana case the question was presented as
to whether leave to sue was a jurisdictional prerequisite where the
action was brought in the form of a suit for damages for personal
injury in the same court which appointed the receiver. In Indiana
distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity as to pleading
and practice are abolished. The court held that though Indiana is
one of the states which hold, following the rule of the United States
Supreme Court in Barton v. Barbour,' that prior leave to sue a
receiver is essential to the jurisdiction of a court over such action,
the
yet the rule can have no application where the action against
2
receiver is brought in the same court which appointed him.
The reasons for the rule that leave to sue a receiver is a jurisdictional prerequisite to maintaining an action against him in another
jurisdiction may be stated as follows: (i) A receiver is an officer
of the court which appoints him, and in the execution of his official
duties ought not to be subject to the embarrassment and hindrance
of suits brought against him without the permission of the courts
whose directions he is carrying out; 8 (2) the property in the hands
of the receiver is in the custody of the court and not subject to
unauthorized disturbance; 4 (3) the object of a receivership is to
conserve the property subject thereto for the benefit of all who have
claims upon it, to secure a just and equitable distribution of it, and
to prevent one creditor or set of creditors from obtaining an undue
advantage over others in the enforcement of their claims-these
objects would be defeated by allowing unauthorized suits against
receivers.5
On the other hand, it is argued that the appointment and control of receivers and the administration of receiverships is a matter
of equity jurisdiction. Hence, whatever protection the receiver
may be entitled to is derived and enforced through the general equity
power to restrain litigation. This power is exercised over 'the persons of the litigants and not over the courts having jurisdiction of
the subject matter of the litigation. So while it is undoubtedly true
that a court of. equity may draw to itself all matters involving a
receivership under its control, it does so by virtue of its control over
the persons involved, and the only method of enforcing its decrees
is by injunction or contempt proceedings, which cannot determine or
affect the jurisdiction of any other court to hear and adjudicate any
104 U. S. 126 (i88I).

'Curtis v. Mauger, 114 N. E. 408 (Indiana Supreme Court, Dec., 1916).
'Thompson v. Scott, 4 Dill. 508, Fed. Cas. 13,975 (1876); In re Cork, 3
Fed. 91 (i88o); Savings Bank v. Simpson, 22 Kan. 414 (1879); Smith v.
Railway Co., 15, Mo. 391 (I899) ; Fleming v. State, 134 Ind. 672 (1893).
' Martin v. Atchinson, 3 Idaho 59o (i8go) ; Chalmers v. Littlefield, 203
Me. 271 (i9o7); Jones v. Moore, io6 Tenn. i88 (igoo), and cases cited in
note 3, supra.
'Barton v. Barbour, supra, note I; Keen v. Breckenridge, 96 Ind. 69
(1884) ; Reed v. Axtell, 84 Va. 231 (1887) ; cases cited in notes 8 and 4, supra.
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controversy which is properly presented to it.6 This view seems to
be logically correct and sound in principle, but whether it meets the
practical necessities of many receivership problems is doubtful. In
an effort to develop a practical working rule many cases have held
that if a receiver wishes to take advantage of the objection to the
jurisdiction he must plead the want of leave to sue as an affirmative
defense, and that an answer to the merits of the case or a general
appearance waives the question of jurisdiction. 7 This is clearly inconsistent with the theory that prior leave to sue is a jurisdictional
prerequisite, for if there can be no jurisdiction without leave to sue
a court would be acting illegally to consider such a case, and d
receiver cannot waive this objection."
It is also argued that to allow other courts jurisdiction over
suits against receivers would not disturb the custody of the court
which appointed the receiver, on the theory that the judgment of
the court is only an adjudication of the legal rights of the parties,
and that the property being in the hands of the court of equity for
distribution is not subject to execution issuing from the other court;
the distribution of the fund and the priority and order of liens is
controlled by the court which appointed the receiver and the proceedings in the other court do not interfere with the proper guardianship of the property by the court of chancery.9
In suits against receivers involving the title to property in the
hands of the receiver, again the cases conflict. As an answer to the
jurisdictional objection it is urged that property which did not belong
to an insolvent, or to which the receiver has no good title is not
properly in the custody of the court and that the decree of the court
appointing the receiver never authorized him to assume control over
property which belongs to some one else, and that the true owner
may proceed in any proper action for damages or to recover possession of the property, no leave to sue being necessary. The receiver
is treated as being a trespasser with regard to such property.10
'Mulcahy v. Strauss, i5i Ill. 70 (1894); St. Joseph, etc., Railroad v.
Smith, ig Kan. 225 (1877), containing a widely quoted opinion by Mr. Justice
Brewer, afterward on the United States Supreme Court; Hirshfield v.
Kalisher, 8i Hun 6o6 (N. Y. 1894) ; Lyman v. Central Vermont Railroad Co.,
59 Vt. 167 (1886) ; Kinney v. Croker, 18 Wis. 74 (1864).
'Mulcahy v. Strauss, supra, note 6; Elkhart Car Works v. Ellis, i3 Ind.
215 (1887) ; American Steel & Wire Co. v. Bearse, 194 Mass. .596 (19o7);
Flentham v. Steward, 45 Neb. 64o (i895); Tobias v. Tobias, 5i Ohio St. 5ig
(1894); Goodale v. Valentine, 69 Wash. 263 (1912).
"Haag v. Ward, 89 Mo. App. I86 (i9oi); Chalmers v. Littlefield, supra,
note 4; Brown v. Rauch, i Wash. 497 (i88g).
'Mulcahy v. Strauss, supra, note 6; Kinney v. Croker, supra, note 6;
Le Fevre v. Matthews, 39 App. Div. 232 (N. Y. 1899), in which it is stated
that failure to obtain leave to sue is a curable irregularity only.
0 Hills v. Parker, ii
Mass. 5o8 (1873); Gutsch v. McIlhargy, 6c Mich.
377 (1888); In re Young, 7 Fed. 855 (i88i); Curran v. Craig, 22 Fed. ioi

NOTES

Where, as in the principal case, the suit is brought in the court
which appointed the receiver, and the same court sits in both equity
and law cases, it is obvious that the reason for the rule no longer
exists and to require leave to be obtained first would be a mere
technicality and not a matter essentially affecting the jurisdiction.
The necessity for providing means for the enforcement of claims
of those who dealt with receivers carrying on a business led to the
enactment of Federal laws providing that receivers appointed by
Federal courts might be sued in other jurisdictions for acts done by
them in the conduct of the business." But in the jurisdictions following Barton v. Barbour,the rule of that case still applies to actions
against Federal receivers when the claim2 is based on matters occurring before the receiver was appointed.'
T.L.H.
RULE-MAKING POWER IN ENGLAND-AMENDMENTS-An inter-

esting example of the exercise of the rule-making power, which in
England has been delegated by the legislature to a judicial committee, is to be found in a recent number of the Law Times.' There
appears a set of amendments to the rules for the English county
courts, signed by the committee of five county court judges, who
have the authority to make rules, "approved" by the rule committee
of the Supreme Court, and "allowed" by the Lord Chancellor, as
provided by the County Courts Act of 1888.2 The rules published
contain twenty separate rules and six forms; they are dated February 19, to go into effect March 19, 1917.

No more convincing argument could be made for the superiority
of judge-made rules of procedure over those made by a legislature
than the following quotation of one of the rules, and of a part of
the explanatory memorandum which accompanies the rules:
"I9. Order XXXIII.

Rule ii is hereby annulled and the fol-

lowing rule shall stand in lieu thereof, viz.:
"'Subject to any directions to the contrary which may be contained in the order transferring the proceedings, damages may be
claimed against the execution creditor in a proceeding by way of interpleader transferred from the High Court to a county court in the
(1884). Contra: Granite Co. v. Wadsworth, 115 Ala. 570 (1896) ; In re Day,
34 Wis. 638 (1874) ; Case v. Duffy, 86 N. Y. Supp. 778 (19o4); Hetzel v.
Fadner, 162 Ill. App. 639 (I911).
I Act of March 3, 1887, as amended by Act of August 13, 1888, U. S.
Compiled Statutes, 19oI, p. 582; Judicial Code of 1911, Sec. 66, U. S. Statutes
at Large, Vol. 36, p. xio4.
"Smith v. Railway Co., 151 Mo. 391 (1899); St. Louis, etc., R. R. v.
Knowles, i8o S. W. 1146 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915).
'Vol. 142, p. 337, March io, 1917.
'Sec. 164.
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same manner as in an interpleader proceeding commenced in a
county court.'
"Explanatory Memorandum.
"Rule i9. The present rule, Order XXXIII, Rule ii, provides
tliat claims to damages shall not be allowed in interpleader proceedings transferred from the High' Court to the County Court. This
rule is based on Oliver v. Lewis, W. N. 1889, 224, in which it was
held that there was no jurisdiction to allow claims for damages in
such proceedings. That report gives no reasons for the decision,
but from the report of the case in the County Courts Chronicle,
January I, 1889 (reprinted from the Law Times), it appears that
the case was decided on the ground that as Order XXVII, of the
County Court Rules, as to county court interpleaders, contained no
provisions relating to transferred actions, the court had, on the construction of the Judicature Act, 1884, Section 17, and the rules, no
jurisdiction to entertain such claims, no rules having been made as
to such claims pursuant to that section.
"The existing rule, Order XXXIII, Rule ii, vas questioned in
the recent case of Salbstein v. Isaacs, 114 L. T. Rep. 235, 1916, I.
K. B. x, but was held to be intra vires. There seems, however, to
be no sufficient reason why remitted interpleaders should be dealt
with in a different manner from county court interpleaders, and
Rule 19 annuls the present rule and provides that, subject to any
directions to the contrary which may be contained in the order
transferring the proceedings, damages may be claimed against the
execution creditor in a remitted interpleader in the same manner
as in an interpleader proceeding commenced in the County Court."
Here we have an illustration of a technical defect in a rule
already difficult because of its technical subject matter, properly
corrected by a professional body and properly explained, so that
practitioners are able to understand the motives for the amendment.
Samuel Rosenbaum.

TORTS-CONSPIRACY-CONTRACT

FOR "CLosED

Snop"--During

the last quarter century the courts have frequently been called upon
to deal with questions arising out of the controversies between organized labor and its employers, and the law as to combinations of
laboring men and the means of carrying them out has been fast
developing. Although statutes were required in a number of states,
it has long since ceased to be doubtful that laboring men may lawfully combine to protect their common interests, and in the furtherance of those interests may stop work together. But as to the legitimate objects of such combinations and the means which may be
used, there has been and is considerable diversity of opinion. One
of the issues upon which many industrial controversies are waged

NOTES

and which presents some difficulties of a legal nature is the question
of the "closed shop." The cases before the courts have most frequently involved the conflicting rights of striking employees and
their former employer. But another phase of the question, of no
less importance, is that of the injury to other employees, or possible
employees.
A number of* courts have taken the position that a strike to
secure a "closed shop" is illegal, because depriving the non-union
man of his right to work for his employer without interference by
third parties." These courts recognize the right of men to strike to
secure for themselves higher wages or better working conditions,
but deny the right to use the economic coercion which a strike necessarily involves in order to attain an object which only indirectly
benefits the members of the union and which seriously injures nonunion employees. On the other hand, many courts take the view
so clearly expressed by Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion in
the case of Plant v. Woods,2 that it is illogical to say that a strike to
obtain direct benefits is lawful and yet that one to strengthen the
position of the union, so as to enable it effectively to strive for such
objects, is unlawful. 3
The same sort of considerations are involved in the closely related question of the legality of contracts voluntarily entered into
between the employer and an association of employees, whereby it
is agreed that none but members of the association shall be employed. Two recent Massachusetts cases deal with this question. In
Tracy, et al., v. Osborne, et al.,4 a contract had been entered into
between a manufacturer and an association of shoe workers, whereby
a provision was made for the amicable adjustment of differences
that might arise, and it was agreed that all work of the employer
in certain designated rooms and departments should be done by
members of the union, and that, as long as there should be a sufficient number of these to do the work, no other help should be employed. Some of the members of the union afterwards withdrew
from it and, forming another association, exerted pressure on the
employers to break the contract. A suit in equity for an injunction
to restrain such conduct was brought by the union; and the court
held that the contract was a legal one and that the plaintiffs were
entitled to be protected by injunction against its breach.
'Lucke v. Clothing Cutters, etc., Assn., 71 Md. 396 (1893); Plant v.
Woods, 176 Mass. 492 (19oo) ; Ruddy v. United Assn., 79 N. J. L. 467 (191o) ;

Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell,
Reiff, 244 Pa. 559 (914).

2o2

Fed.

512 (l912);

Bausbach v.

'Supra, note I.
'Nat. Protective Assn. v. Cumming, 17o N. Y. 315 (go) ; Parkinson Co.
v. Bldg. Trades Council, 154 Cal. 581 (i9o8); Kemp v. Division No. 241, 255
111. 213 (1912).

' 114 N. E. 959 (1917)....
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5
In the other case, Shinsky v. Tracy, et al., decided the same
caused by his disdamages
union
for
sued
the
the
plaintiff
day,
charge, basing his claim upon the existence of a contract similar to
that in Tracy v. Osborne. But the plaintiff also proved that he not
only lost the benefit of his contract of employment, but that, by
reason of the defendants' control over the shoe industry in the city
of Lynn, it had become practically impossible for him to obtain employment there at his trade. On these facts a recovery was allowed.'
The distinction seems to be that where the contract in question
is such as to deprive the non-union man of practically all opportunity to work at his trade in a community, it is illegal and its execution renders the parties liable in an action in tort to those injured
by it; but where the contract is one from which the parties derive
substantial benefits for themselves, and which injures no one at
that time employed, the contract is a legal one, and any injury incident to it is damnurn absque injuria. The further distinction is
6
pointed out between Tracy v. Osborne and prior authority, in that
here the injured parties were not at the time of the contract employees, and therefore no malice toward them is to be found in an
intentional procuring of their discharge. The latter distinction is
one which is not accepted in other jurisdictions. Little reason for
it appears, for such employment as is interfered with is in almost
all cases terminable at will. But the illegality of contracts which
practically deprive the non-union 7laborer of his opportunity to work
is asserted in a number of states.
Tracy v. Osborne, on its own facts, is in accord with the author9
But the signifiities, not only in Massachusetts," but elsewhere.
cance of the opinion lies in the attitude of the courts of
that state toward labor combinations, restricting their legitimate
1
activities to those involving direct benefits to the members. "
The qualification represented by Shinsky v. Tracy, that such
contracts may not unreasonably restrict the opportunity of nonunion men to obtain work, is also supported by considerable authority,11 and will undoubtedly be accepted as law in many jurisdictions.
But it remains to be seen what will be the position of the courts

5 114 N. E.957 (1917).
'Berry v. Donavan, 188 Mass. 353 (19o5); Hanson v. Innis,

211

Mass.

301 (1912).

Curran v. Galen, 22 N. Y. Supp. 826 (1892) ; Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N.
Schwarcz v. Int. Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 124 N.
Supp. 968 (igio) ; Connors v. Connelly, 86 Conn. 641 (913).
• Hoban v. Dempsey, 217 Mass. 166 (1914).
"Jacobs v. Cohen, supra, note 7; Kissam v. U. S. Printing Co., 199 N.
76 (igio); Nat. Fireproofing Co. v. Mason Builders' Assn., 169 Fed. 259,
C. C. A. 535 (909).
' Plant v. Woods, supra.
11Note 7, supra.
'

207 (9o5);

Y.
Y.
Y.
94
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which take the view that the laborer has the right to quit work in
concert with others, just as well as singly, for any reason he sees fit,
so long as there is an absence of actual malice. 1 2 On this reasoning
it would seem that the "closed. shop" extended over an entire community or industry would be a legitimate object of a strike. From
this it would follow that a peaceful adjustment by contract could be
made, although thereby the non-union man was compelled to choose
between joining the union and being driven out of his trade or
locality.

W. W. S.

TRusTs-Cy Pres DOCTRINE-CHARITIES-ADINISTRATION BY
THE

COURT-The doctrine of approximation or cy pres has been

frequently invoked by the courts in an effort to give effect to the
intention of a testator when the scheme of distribution breaks down.
The two well-known instances of its application are the cases where
a charity has failed in some of its details and where the rule against
perpetuities has intervened.
A recent New Hampshire case I presented the question as to
what was the controlling purpose of the testator under the rule that
where the formal intention fails, effect will be given to the substantial
intention.2 Property was devised to a Catholic parish in trust to
build a church to be named after the testator, a Protestant. The
testator expressed the wish that a tablet of bronze should perpetuate
the memory of himself, his wife and family; and the hope that the
gift prove "a lasting benefit to the people of the parish for many
generations." It was contended that the devise to the parish was
void because the rules of the church forbade the naming of a church
for a Protestant. The court considered that the property was not
given to the parish on condition that it build a church to be known
by the testator's name, but in trust to be used for the benefit of the
inhabitants. The court in reaching that conclusion cast aside the
natural desire of the testator to create a monument to his name and
laid hold of the fundamentally charitable purpose, which should have
prompted the gift.
A similar conclusion was reached in a case 3 in the same jurisdiction, where a gift was made to establish a hospital in Franklin, to
be known as the Proctor Hospital. Owing to the existence of a
hospital in that town, it was impracticable to carry out the exact intention of the testatrix. The income was directed to be used in main"Parkinson Co. v. Bldg. Trades Council, supra; Kemp v. Division No.
241, supra.
'Gagnon v. Wellman, 99 AtI. 786 (N. H. i917).
'Phila. v. Girard, 45 Pa. 27 (1863); Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. 539
(1867).
'Adams v. Page, 76 N. H. 96 (1911).
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taining a ward in the existing hospital, to be known as the Proctor
ward, the court saying, "It is true she says the hospital is to be called
the Proctor Hospital, but that has no great tendency to prove that
it was a wish to have it known by that name, which induced the
bequest. It is more probable that the provision in respect to the
name, like that in respect to the trustee's duties was merely a part
of her scheme for administering the trust. It cannot be found from
such evidence that she intended her heirs should have the property
if her scheme for administering the'trust ever broke down."
Thus we find the New Hampshire courts exceedingly desirous
of approaching the testator's intention. But Chief Justice Doe, in
his anxiety to work out the testator's scheme, reached a result calculated to do violence to his plan. A gift had been made to testator's
grandchildren when the youngest arrived at the age of forty years.
The court made the gift vest when the youngest grandchild reached
twenty-one, thus paring down the period of 4postponement to bring
the device within the rule against perpetuities. A more likely interpretation would be that the gift to the testator's grandchildren was
designedly postponed until their attaining mature years; and we ask,
if the testator had known that the deferred bounty could not vest as
presented, would he have chanced the vesting of the property, at a
time, when, as he viewed it, the passions and extravagances of youth
would dissipate the substance he had 5collected?
The court, in the principal case, saw by way of dicta that in
applying the cy pres doctrine, it makes no difference whether the
plan breaks down because of illegality or changed conditions. This
is bofne out by the Mormon case,6 where property devoted to polygamous purposes was decreed to be diverted to different legitimate
channels. An excellent illustration" of altered circumstances occasioning the application of the doctrine was a bequest of a fund to
trustees to erect a church. At the time when testator died the neighborhood was a flourishing one by reason of a racetrack in the vicinity. The racetrack gone, the village stagnated, and there was no
hope of a congregation to support the church, if built. The court,
approaching the subject as in our principal case, said the general
charitable intent was to benefit the Episcopal Church in the neighborhood of the community in question, and applied the fund accordingly.
Where the object of the testator's bounty, though in existence,
is incapable of accomplishing the end desired, the fund will be applied cy pres. So in the case of a bequest to a hospital, chartered,8
but not a going concern; another hospital in the same city benefited.
'In Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N. H. 434 (891).
'See note i, supra.
Latter Day Saints v. U. S., 136 U. S. i (1889).
'St. James Church v. Willson, 82 N. J. E. 546 (1913).
'Nichols v. Newark Hospital, yi N. J. E. 130 (I9O6).

NOTES

It has been said that no valid reason can be given why the
charity should not be administered cy pres as well when the scheme
breaks down before, as when that does not happen until after the
administration begins;9 but a well-considered New Jersey case "
flatly decided that charitable legacies lapsed, if at the time of the
death of the testator it was impossible to carry the actual intention
of the testator into effect. There a bequest to a fund for sick seamen at Brooklyn Navy Yard was not awarded to a seamen's society
claiming the fund, when it appeared that there was no fund, and the
chaplain supposed to administer it was not living.
In some states "1statutes exist defining the cy pres doctrine, of
which the Georgia statute is the clearest statement. 2 In Pennsylvania there is a statute bearing on the subject, 3 but the doctrine was
in force prior to its enactment, 4 and has been repeatedly reaffirmed. 1"
The cy pres doctrine applies to charities, not every worthy object, so where a statue to the memory of testatrix's husband
could not be erected in a certain hall, dedicated to survivors of War
of the Rebellion from that county, since he was a native of another
state, the trust failed."
C.B.W.
'See note 3, supra.
1
Brown v. Condit, 7o N. J. E. 44o (i9o5).
Ga. Code .No. 4604; Conn. Rev. Statutes Io34.
"If the specific mode of execution be for any cause impossible and the
charitable intent be still manifest and definite, the court may, by approximation give effect in a manner next most consonant with the specific mode
presented."
"Act of 1895, P. L. II4: No disposition of property heretofore or hereafter made for any religious, charitable, literary or scientific use shall fail for
want of a trustee, or by reason of the objects being indefinite, uncertain, or
ceasing, or depending upon the discretion of a last trustee, or being given in
perpetuity or in excess of the annual value hereinbefore limited, but it shall
be the duty of the orphans' court or court having equity jurisdiction in the
proper county to supply a trustee, and by its decrees to carry into effect the
intent of the donor or testator so far as same be ascertained and carried into
effect consistently with law or equity.
" Phila. v. Girard, note 2, supra; Lennig's Estate, 31 W. N. C. 234 (Pa.
1892).

" Hamilton v. Mercer Home, 228 Pa. 410 (19io) ; Kramph's Estate,
Pa. 455 (igo) ; Hope's Estate, 253 Pa. 4oo (I916).
"Davis' Estate, 6i Pitts. Law Journal 56o (Pa. 1913).
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